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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 TUNIS 5209

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, XX
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY
ASSISTANCE TO TUNISIA

REF: STATE 167901

1. U.S. INTERESTS

A. U.S. INTERESTS SERVED BY SECURITY ASSISTANCE.
TUNISIA'S LOCATION, APPROXIMATELY MIDWAY BETWEEN THE SUEZ
CANAL AND GIBRALTAR AND COMMANDING THE NARROW PASSAGE BE-
TWEEN NORTH AFRICA AND SICILY, ACCORDS IT A STRATEGIC
IMPORTANCE GREATER THAN ITS SIZE AND RESOURCES WOULD
INDICATE. THIS IMPORTANCE HAS INCREASED IN RECENT YEARS
WITH INSTABILITY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. TUNISIA
REMAINS THE ONLY COUNTRY ON THE TOTAL PERIPHERY OF THE

MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL WHICH OFFERS REGULAR AND VARIED
ACCESS TO ITS PORTS AND WATERS FOR U.S. WARSHIP, IN-
CLUDING NUCLEAR POWERED VESSELS. TUNISIA'S PRO-U.S.
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ORIENTATION AND MODERATING INFLUENCE IN ARAB POLITICAL
CIRCLES IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE AS IS THE EXIST-
ENCE OF A MODERATE TUNISIA BETWEEN THE TWO RADICAL
STATES OF LIBYA AND ALGERIA. A TUNISIA HOSTILE TO
THE U.S. COULD IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES THREATEN EAST-
WEST SHIPPING, ALLIED STAGING AREAS IN THE CENTRAL
WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN, AND SERIOUSLY COMPOUND REIN-

FORCEMENT PROBLEMS IN THE NATO SOUTHERN REGION.

B. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES. TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TUNISIAN MILITARY FORCES' DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES; TO PROMOTE CONTINUED FAVORABLE BILATERAL RELATIONS; AND TO HELP MAINTAIN TUNISIA'S MODERATE ORIENTATION.

2. TUNISIAN PERCEPTION OF THREAT

ALGERIA AND LIBYA EACH POSE A POTENTIAL THREAT TO TUNISIA BECAUSE OF SHARP DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND ALGERIAN AND LIBYAN MILITARY SUPERIORITY. DURING 1976 THE TUNISIANS WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED OVER LIBYAN INTENTIONS. IN EARLY 1976, THERE WAS A LIBYAN ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE THE TUNISIAN PRIME MINISTER AND PERHAPS OTHER OFFICIALS. DURING JULY OF 1976, TUNISIAN FORCES WERE PUT ON ALERT DUE TO FEAR OF A LIBYAN INVASION OR TERRORIST ACTIVITY. DURING 1977, LIBYA AND TUNISIA AGAIN WERE IN DISPUTE OVER OFF-SHORE OIL RIGHTS. THESE DISPUTES RESULTED IN SHOW-OF-FORCE CONFRONTATION; HOWEVER, AGREEMENTS WERE MADE WHICH REDUCED THE TENSION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. RECENT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS HAVE DECREASED TENSIONS AND THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THERE IS A MAJOR EFFORT ON THE PART OF BOTH LIBYA AND TUNISIA TO IMPROVE THEIR OVERALL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. TUNISIA, HOWEVER, CONTINUES TO DISTRUST
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LIBYAN INTENTIONS; LIBYA HAS CONSTANTLY BLAMED TUNISIA FOR THE FAILURE OF A MERGER AGREEMENT IN 1974. RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA WERE SEVERELY STRAINED IN LATE 1975 AND 1976 DUE TO TUNISIA'S SUPPORT OF MOROCCO OVER THE WESTERN SAHARAN ISSUE. FACED WITH HARSH CRITICISM ON THE PART OF ALGERIA, TUNISIA QUICKLY SOUGHT TO EXTRICATE ITSELF FROM THE DISPUTE. RELATIONS HAVE SINCE IMPROVED; HOWEVER, IMPORTANT AND BASIC IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES REMAIN.

3. MISSION'S PERCEPTION OF THREAT

ALTHOUGH LIBYA, AND TO A LESS EXTENT ALGERIA, POSE A THREAT TO TUNISIA, AN ARMED ATTACK AGAINST TUNISIA IS UNLIKELY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THE THREAT OF SUBVERSION, ESPECIALLY FROM LIBYA, IS POTENTIALLY SERIOUS. IF THERE IS TURMOIL OVER SUCCESSION FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF BOURGUIBA, LIBYA AND POSSIBLY ALGERIA COULD INTERVENE TO SUPPORT TUNISIAN FACTIONS FRIENDLY TO THEM.

4. HOST COUNTRY MILITARY NEEDS.

SINCE GAINING ITS INDEPENDENCE IN 1956 TUNISIA HAS-- UNTIL VERY RECENTLY--GIVEN ITS MILITARY LOW PRIORITY.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT HAVE CONSISTENTLY RECEIVED THE GREATEST SHARE OF THE TUNISIAN BUDGET. GROWING CONCERNS OVER LIBYA AND TO A LESSER EXTENT OVER ALGERIA CAUSED TUNISIA TO EMBARK ON A MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IN 1976. THE TUNISIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE STATED THAT THE COST OF THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM FOR THE ARMED FORCES WAS TO BE APPROXIMATELY \$500 MILLION. TUNISIA'S BASIC DEFENSE STRATEGY IS TWO-FOLD. FIRST, IT IS TO ENSURE ADEQUATE AIR PROTECTION FOR HER COMBAT TROOPS AND TO POSSESS SUFFICIENT GROUND CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT A DELAYING ACTION AGAINST A THREAT FROM EITHER LIBYA OR ALGERIA. SECONDLY, TO USE THE TIME GAINED TO ORGANIZE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND ELSEWHERE.

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 6 LTRS TO FIG)

5. MISSION ASSESSMENT OF HOST COUNTRY NEEDS
THE DEFENSIVE CONCEPT OF THE TUNISIAN MILITARY

WARRANTS CONTINUED SUPPORT FROM THE USG. TUNISIA HAS NO DESIGNS ON ANY OF ITS NEIGHBORS, AND ITS MILITARY POSTURE IS DEFENSIVE ONLY. THE U.S. COUNTRY TEAM IN TUNISIA AGREES WITH THE DESIGN AND CONCEPT OF THE TUNISIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH IS VIEWED AS COMPLEMENTARY TO U.S. POLICY IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. THE COUNTRY TEAM ALSO BELIEVES THAT THERE ARE NO REALISTIC ALTERNATIVES WHICH WOULD BE LESS COSTLY OR WHICH WOULD BE MORE BENEFICIAL TO U.S. INTERESTS.

6. ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE SPENDING

TUNISIA HAS THROUGHOUT ITS TWO DECADES OF INDEPENDENCE CONCENTRATED ITS NATIONAL BUDGET ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT,

WITH EDUCATION TRADITIONALLY TAKING THE LION'S SHARE AND DEFENSE BEING SUPPORTED AT MINIMAL LEVELS. GIVEN CONCERN OVER EXTERNAL SECURITY THREATS FROM ITS

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NEIGHBORS AND, DESPITE EFFECTIVE MAINTENANCE, THE INCREASING OBSOLESCENCE OF ITS KOREAN WAR VINTAGE EQUIPMENT, THE GOT HAS SINCE 1976 EMBARKED UPON A FIVE-YEAR, \$500-600 MILLION PROGRAM OF RE-EQUIPMENT TO MAINTAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF ITS DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY. CONSEQUENTLY, THE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NATIONAL BUDGET DEVOTED TO DEFENSE HAS RISEN FROM 5.5 PERCENT IN FY 75 TO 7 PERCENT IN FY 76, 8 PERCENT IN FY 77 AND 7 PERCENT IN FY 78. SELF-FINANCED DEFENSE EXPENDITURES HAVE RISEN FROM 1.8 PERCENT OF GNP IN FY 76 TO AN ESTIMATED 3.9 PERCENT IN FY 78. DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP SHOULD PEAK AT 4.7 PERCENT IN FY 79 AND IS EXPECTED TO DECLINE TO BELOW 3 PERCENT OF GNP BY 1981. MILITARY IMPORTS HAVE BEEN AND REMAIN A SMALL FRACTION OF TOTAL TUNISIAN IMPORTS. WHILE A PRECISE STATISTICAL BREAKDOWN IS DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT MILITARY IMPORTS HAVE RISEN FROM 295 PERCENT OF TOTAL MERCHANDISE IMPORTS IN FY 76 (\$39 MILLION OUT OF \$1.5 BILLION) TO 4.4 PERCENT IN FY 78 (I.E., \$98 MILLION OF \$2 BILLION IN TOTAL IMPORTS). WITH MILITARY IMPORTS EXPECTED TO PEAK AT 14.9 MILLION IN FY 79, THEY WOULD BRIEFLY EXCEED 6.5 PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS. AS WE VIEW IT, TUNISIA'S MILITARY RE-EQUIPMENT PROGRAM IS A PRUDENT ONE, WELL WITHIN ITS GROWING FINANCIAL ABILITIES, AND ENTAILING NO DEPARTURE FROM ITS DEVELOPMENT-ORIENTED POLICIES. PARTICULARLY SINCE IT BENEFITED FROM COMMODITY PRICE INCREASES IN 1974, TUNISIA HAS BOASTED A LOW DEBT SERVICE RATION WHICH, WHILE UP IN 1977, STILL ONLY RACHED 11.3 PERCENT. THE EXPECTED INCREASE IN ITS DEBT SERVICE RATION TO 17.4 PERCENT IN 1981 SHOULD LEAVE TUNISIA STILL WITH A SUPERIOR INTERNATIONAL CREDIT

STANDING AND NOSERIOUS PROBLEMS OF DEBT SERVICING.

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7. ESTIMATED HOST COUNTRY ACQUISITIONS

ESTIMATED ACQUISITIONS REMAIN AS REPORTED IN FY 80-84 MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROJECTION. MATERIAL ITEMS PROCURES IN FY 80 SHOULD BE TWELVE M109A1 155MM SP HOWITZERS AND EIGHT COASTAL PATROL CRAFT. PURCHASES FOR FY 81-82 SHOULD BE ONLY SUPPLY SUPPORT, AND A LIMITED AMOUNT OF OTHER ARTICLES AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT. FMS CREDIT OBTAINED DURING THESE YEARS WILL BE USED TO FUND PREVIOUS YEARS' OBLIGATIONS.

8. ASSESSMENT OF PROJECTED ACQUISITIONS

ALL PROJECTED ACQUISITIONS ARE DESIGNED TO SUPPLEMENT PRVIOUS PURCHASES IN ORDER TO BUILD AN APPROPRIATE DEFENSE POSTURE. PURCHASE OF ADDITIONAL ARTILLERY EQUIPMENT IS REQUIRED TO AUGMENT THE TUNISIAN ARMY'S TWO 105MM ARTILLERY BATTALIONS AND HER ONE 155MM ARTILLERY BATTALION. THE LIMITED MOBILITY OF THESE UNITS AND THE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS TO POSITION ARMY MANEUVER UNITS IN A WIDELY DISPERSED PATTERN DICTATE THE ADDED 155MM SP HOWITZERS RECENT OFF-SHORE OIL DISPUTES WITH LIBYA EXPOSED THE INABILITY OF THE TUNISIAN NAVY TO PROVIDE EVEN MARGINAL COASTAL PROTECTION. ACQUISITION OF THE COASTAL PATROL INTERDICTION CRAFT WILL ASSIST IN THAT PROTECTION.

9. ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC IMPACT

ACQUISITION OF THE ARTICLES AND SERVICES PROJECTED TO BE REQUIRD UNDER THE FMS PROGRAM SHOULD NOT HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT NEGATIVE IMPACT ON TUNISIA'S ABILITY TO PURSUE ITS PRIORITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GOALS. FOREIGN EXCHANGE COSTS FOR THESE PURCHASES WILL NOT LOOM LARGE WITHIN THE TOTAL CONTEXT OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR OF THE TUNISIAN ECONOMY AND ITS SIZABLE FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS. PERSONNEL DEVOTED TO USE AND SUPPORT OF THE EQUIPMENT SHOULD NOT DETRACT IN ANY SIGNIFICANT DEGREE FROM AVAILABILITIES OF KEY PERSONNEL WITIN THE CIVILIAN ECONOMY. (IN FACT, THE

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TUNISIAN MILITARY TENDS TO MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL HUMAN RESOURCES THROUGH ITS ITERACY AND TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR CONSCRIPTS.) AGAIN, THE EFFECT ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES SHOULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANT.

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WHILE IN RECENT YEARS THE GOT HAS WORKED WITH FAIRLY LOW AVERAGE INTERNATIONAL RESERVES, THIS HAS REFLECTED ITS DELIBERATE POLICY OF MAKING FULL USE OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND ECONOMIZING ON DEBT SERVICE CHARGES. TUNISIA IS A CLEAR CASE OF A DEVELOPING COUNTRY STILL PASSING THROUGH A NORMAL STAGE OF CAPITAL IMPORTATION. EXPERT INTERNATIONAL OPINION AGREES THAT CAPITAL IS EMPLOYED PRODUCTIVELY IN TUNISIA AND THAT ITS NATIONAL GROWTH SHOULD ASSURE THAT DEBT SERVICE AND FUTURE REPAYMENTS ARE NOT AN INCREASING BURDEN ON ITS CITIZENS. AS IS THE CASE WITH CONCESSIONAL LENDING FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THERE IS ALSO, IN THE EMBASSY'S VIEW, CLEAR ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUING FMS FINANCING FOR TUNISIA. THE GOT QUITE LOGICALLY IS SEEKING TO MAINTAIN A DEBT STRUCTURE WITH AS LONG MATURITIES AS POSSIBLE. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE 8 TO 12-YEAR TERMS OF THE FMS PROGRAM ARE ATTRACTIVE AND AFFORD A MEANS TO HELP MEET THE COUNTRY'S BASIC DEFENSE NEEDS WITHOUT EXCESSIVELY BURDENING ITS GROWING ECONOMY IN THE YEARS OF EQUIPMENT ACQUISITION.

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10. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT

THE PURCHASE OF THE 155MM SP HOWITZERS AND THE EIGHT COASTAL PATROL CRAFT WILL BE CLASSIFIED AS MAJOR DEFENSE ITEMS AND WILL REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION. TUNISIA'S DESIRE FOR AN IMPROVED LAND AND SEA DEFENSE IS DESIGNED TO COUNTER SOPHISTICATED MODERN WEAPONS POSSESSED BY BOTH ALGERIA AND LIBYA. THE QUANTITATIVE ADVANTAGE OF THE COMBINED MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS OF ALGERIA AND LIBYA OVER TUNISIA IS ALMOST 10:1.

11. HUMAN RIGHTS

THE PRESENT HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN TUNISIA IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THAT OUTLINED IN THE DEPARTMENT'S JANUARY 1978 REPORT TO CONGRESS. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE TENSION IN TUNISIA FOLLOWING SERIOUS CIVIL DISTURBANCES ON JANUARY 26, 1978, AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS SINCE SHOWN A GREATER SENSITIVITY TO CRITICISM. NEVERTHELESS, OPPONENTS OF THE REGIME CONTINUE TO SPEAK TO THE FOREIGN PRESS, TO PUBLISH THEIR CRITICISM LOCALLY, AND TO TRAVEL ABROAD. THE GOVERNMENT HAS PERMITTED A SECOND OPPOSITION NEWSPAPER TO BEGIN OPERATIONS SINCE JANUARY 26. THOSE ACCUSED OF FOMENTING THESE DISTURBANCES WILL SHORTLY BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL. THE TUNISIAN GOVERNMENT HAS STATED THAT THE ACCUSED WILL BE TRIED IN CIVIL COURTS UNDER NORMAL PROCEDURES. OUR CURRENT SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS FORMULATED TO PROMOTE U.S. HUMAN RIGHT OBJECTIVES. OUR ASSISTANCE IS DIRECTED EXCLUSIVELY AT PROVIDING TUNISIA WITH A CREDIBLE DEFENSE AGAINST PERCEIVED EXTERNAL THREATS, PRINCIPALLY FROM RADICAL REGIMES IN LIBYA AND ALGERIA. WE BELIEVE THAT AN ENHANCED DEFENSE CAPABILITY OBTAINED THROUGH MEANS THAT DO NOT DETRACT SIGNIFICANTLY FROM DEVELOPMENTAL EFFORTS COULD MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO

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ORDERLY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. SUCH DEVELOPMENT WILL PROVIDE THE BEST CLIMATE FOR MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING HUMAN RIGHTS IN TUNISIA.

12. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES

A. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. OVER THE YEARS, TUNISIA HAS BEEN ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BOTH IN OBTAINING FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND EMPLOYING IT PRODUCTIVELY. AS TUNISIA IS ENTERING A "MIDDLE INCOME" POSITION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD, IT HAS ACCEPTED THE NECESSITY OF INCREASED USE OF COMMERCIAL CREDITS AND GRADUALLY LESS LIBERAL TERMS FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. THE LATTER,

HOWEVER, REMAINS CRITICAL TO THE COUNTRY'S FIFTH ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (1977-81), ESPECIALLY AS IT SEEKS TO SUPPLEMENT DIRECTLY PRODUCTIVE INVESTMENTS WITH OTHERS, WITH LONGER-TERM PAYOFFS, MEETING OHE BASIC HUMAN NEEDS OF POORER RURAL POPULATIONS. THE FIFTH PLAN PROJECTS AN INVESTMENT OUTLAY OF APPROXIMATELY \$2 BILLION PER YEAR, WITH \$665 MILLION COMING FROM FOREIGN SOURCES. OF THIS, ABOUT \$250 MILLION IS TO COME FROM PUBLIC SOURCES--PRIMARILY CONCESSIONAL ASSISTANCE. ESTIMATED CAPITAL ASSISTANCE DISBURSEMENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 1977 WERE \$237.4 MILLION. IN ADDITION, AN ESTIMATED \$67.9 MILLION WAS DISBURSED IN GRANT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. THE TOP TWELVE MAJOR DONORS IN 1977, RANKED IN ORDER OF ESTIMATED DISBURSEMENT OF CAPITAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS, WERE AS FOLLOWS:

DONORS	1977
IBRD	46
FRG	46
FRANCE	30
UAE	24
USA	18

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KUWAIT	16
CANADA	15
SWEDEN	15
AF DEV BANK	13
IRAQ	10
BELGIUM	10
SAUDI ARABIA	9

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B. MILITARY ASSISTANCE. TUNISIA HAS RECEIVED MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES: AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, CHINA, EGYPT, FRANCE, GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC), ITALY, MOROCCO, UNITED KINGDOM, USSR AND YUGOSLAVIA. THIS ASSISTANCE HAS INCLUDED GRANTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND HARDWARE, AND FINANCIAL GRANTS FOR PURCHASES AND FAVORABLE CREDIT TERMS, AND HAVE INCLUDED SOME OF THE FOLLOWING ITEMS: PANZERGEAGER-K 105MM SPAT GUNS FROM AUSTRIA; THE MILAN AND SS-11 AT MISSILES, SMALL ARMS AND ARMORED VEHICLES FROM FRANCE; JET TRAINERS FROM ITALY; VEHICLES (ALL TYPES), MOBILE FIELD HOSPITAL AND KITCHEN UNITS FROM WEST GERMANY; PATROL CRAFT FROM UK, FRANCE AND CHINA; SMALL ARMS AND WEAPONS FROM BELGIUM AND REPORTEDLY SMALL ARMS AND WEAPONS FROM CHINA, THE USSR AND YUGOSLAVIA. ASSISTANCE HAS ALSO BEEN PROVIDED IN THE FORM OF INCREASED TRAINING QUOTAS FOR TUNISIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN FRANCE, UK, BELGIUM, WEST GERMANY, ITALY, EGYPT AND MOROCCO. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TEAMS HAVE ALSO BEEN AND ARE BEING PROVIDED BY FRANCE, UK, ITALY AND WEST GERMANY FOR REPAIR OF VEHICLES, SMALL ARMS, AND COMMUNICATIONS
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EQUIPMENT. IN SEPTEMBER 1977, FRANCE INCREASED THE NUMBER OF MILITARY ADVISORS IN TUNISIA FROM 7 TO 43. NO OTHER COUNTRY IS KNOWN TO HAVE OFFICIAL MILITARY ADVISORS WORKING WITH THE TUNISIAN ARMED FORCES. IN MOST INSTANCES IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASCERTAIN WHEN EQUIPMENT OR SERVICES HAVE BEEN RANTED TO TUNISIA OR WHEN THE GOT HAS PAID FOR (PARTIAL OR COMPLETE) AID AND THE TERMS. AGREEMENT HAVE BEEN REACHED WITH FRANCE FOR THE GAZELLE HELICOPTER AND THE THOMPSON RADAR UNITS. FRANCE HAS ALSO BEEN ASKED TO PROVIDE MORE AMX-13 VEHICLES AND ALSO TO PROVIDE THE AMX-30 MEDIUM TANK AND THE AMX 10 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER TO UNITS OF THE TUNISIAN ARMY. DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN HELD WITH SWEDISH AND ITALIAN FIRMS FOR THE POSSIBLE ACQUISITION OF GROUND RADAR UNITS AND WITH ITALIAN FIRMS FOR THE POSSIBLE ACQUISITION OF SEVERAL AERITALIA G-222 TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT.

13. COUNTRY PROGRAM LEVELS

A. LEVEL ONE. THE MINIMUM LEVEL FOR A SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO TUNISIA TO CONTINUE AT ALL WOULD BE THE PRE-FY 76 LEVEL MINUS GRANT-AID MATERIAL. THIS LEVEL WOULD BE \$0.4 MILLION IMET AND \$5.0 MILLION FMS CREDIT. PRIOR TO 1976 TUNISIA WAS RECEIVING CONSIDERABLE MATERIALS UNDER MAP. LEVEL ONE PROJECTED ASSISTANCE WOULD BE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THOSE ITEMS RECEIVED UNDER MAP.

B. LEVEL TWO. THE INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE PROJECTED FOR TUNISIA WOULD BE A COMPLEMENTARY PACKAGE AIMED AT SUPPORTATIVE ASSISTANCE IN MODERNIZING AND REPLACING MAP ACQUIRED ITEMS. A RECOMMENDED LEVEL TWO
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WOULD BE \$0.6 IMET AND \$15.0 MILLION FMS CREDIT.

C. LEVEL THREE. THE PRESENT LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE IS DESIGNED TO AID TUNISIA WITH ITS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. THE CURRENT LEVEL THREE IS \$25.0 MILLION FMS CREDIT AND \$1.25 MILLION IMET. CURRENT LEVEL SHOULD DECREASE AFTER COMPLETION OF MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

\$. INCREMENTAL LEVEL. SHOULD TUNISIA DECIDE TO PURCHASE A U.S. MANUFACTURED REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT FOR THEIR AGED MAP ACQUIRED F-86, FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO SUPPORTING THIS PURCHASE WITH INCREMENTAL INCREASES IN THEIR CURRENT LEVEL OF FMS CREDIT. FY-80 GUARANTY CREDIT SHOULD BE INCREASED BY \$10.0 TO A \$35.0 MILLION LEVEL. FMS CREDIT FOR FY-81-82 WOULD LIKEWISE REQUIRE AN INCREASE TO BRING THOS LEVELS TO \$35.0 MILLION PER YEAR. IMET WOULD NOT REQUIRE A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OVER ROJECTED LEVELS AS TRAINING IN SUPPORT OF THE FMS PURCHASE WOULD BE OBTAINED BY FMS ALSO.

E. EXPECTED ACCOMPLISHMENT. LEVEL ONE WILL ATTAIN BASIC SUPPORT OF US MAP ACQUIRED ITEMS. LEVEL TWO WILL AID IN BASIC MOERNIZATIONAND REPLACEMENT OF MAP ACQUIRED ITEMS WHILE LEVEL THREE WILL AID WITH OVERALL MODERNIZATIONPROGRAM. INCREMENTAL LEVEL WILL PERMIT TUNISIA TO ACHIEVE A MORE CREDIBLE DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

F. MANNING LEVELS. RECOMMENDED MANNING FOR LEVEL ONE WOULD BE TWO OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO DEFENSE ATTACHE'S OFFICE WITH SOLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE.

THESE TWO INDIVIDUALS WOULD HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
IMET PROGRAMMING AND ADMINISTRATION AS WELL AS FMS
MANAGEMENT. RECOMMENDED MANNING FOR LEVEL TWO WOULD
BE THREE U.S. OFFICERS AND ONE U.S. SECRETARY, ASSIGNED
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TO AN ODC AGAIN SHARING TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY
ASSISTANCE. UNDER LEVEL TWO THE INCREASED MANNING OVER LEVEL ONE
WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ACCOMMODATE AN EXPANSION PROGRAM
AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. LEVEL THREE AND INCREMENTAL
LEVEL PROGRAMS SHOULD BE MANAGED BY THE CURRENT MANNING
OF SIX U.S. MILITARY, ONE GSO SECRETARY, ONE FOREIGN
NATIONAL SECRETARY, AND TWO FOREIGN NATIONAL CHAUFFEURS.
MANNING FOR LEVEL THREE WOULD ACCOMMODATE FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT MANAGEMENT, FMS, AND
IMET PROGRAMMING AND MANAGEMENT, AS WELL AS DISPOSAL
AND ADMINISTRATION OF MAP ACQUIRED EQUIPMENT.

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G. NOT APPLICABLE.

H. TRAINING LEVELS. IMET LEVELS ARE PROPOSED FOR
TRAINING IN ORDER TO PROVIDE PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION

FOR THE TUNISIAN MILITARY. TUNISIA WILL DIRECT HER UTILIZATION OF IMET TOWARD PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION WHICH HAS PROVEN TO BE OF MAXIMUM MUTUAL BENEFIT TO THE UNITED STATES AND TUNISIA. THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE A NEED FOR SOME LIMITED TECHNICAL TRAINING THROUGH IMET ON A SELECTIVE BASIS. MAJOR FMS PURCHASES, SUCH AS CHAPARRAL, INCLUDING TRAINING. TUNISIA WOULD PROBABLY PURCHASE TRAINING FROM GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, GREECE OR ITALY RATHER THAN FROM THE U.S. IF IMET WERE NOT AVAILABLE INASMUCH AS TRANSPORTATION COSTS WOULD BE MUCH LOWER. ALTHOUGH TUNISIA RECOGNIZES THE SUPERIOR TRAINING PROVIDED BY THE U.S. MILITARY, SUCH TRAINING IS VIEWED AS ESPECIALLY EXPENSIVE WHEN COMPARED TO LOWER COSTS FOR TRAINING IN EUROPE.

I. AMBASSADOR'S ESTIMATE. AMBASSADOR BELIEVES THAT PRESENT PROGRAM LEVELS ARE REALISTIC FOR FY 80.
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HE RECOMMENDS THAT TUNISIA REMAIN AT LEVEL THREE FOR FY 80, AND IF TUNISIAN DEFENSE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM PROGRESSES AS PLANNED, THAT THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR TUNISIA BE DROPPED TO LEVEL TWO IN FY 81 AND TO LEVEL ONE IN FY 82.
MULCAHY

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NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SECURITY, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, ANNUAL REPORTS
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Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
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Disposition Case Number: n/a
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Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Office: ACTION PM
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
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SAS ID: 1919429
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO TUNISIA
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, XX, TS, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/85a88a6e-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
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